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American Journal of Sociology
Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction. By Wilhelm Hennis. Translated
by Keith Tribe. London: Allen & Unwin, 1988. Pp. 254. $39.95.
Braulio Munoz
Swarthmore College
Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction consists of five separate essays
related by a central question: How is Max Weber to be read today? The
volume shows the strengths and weaknesses of most collections of essays
published as a book. On the one hand, the kinds of issues Wilhelm
Hennis addresses and the style of his writing-the Nietzschean turns of
phrase, the sense of play, the pregnant statements given full reign-fit
rather nicely within the confined parameters of the essay form. On the
other, the narrative often moves in cryptic circles, relying heavily on the
reader's erudite knowledge of 19th-century social philosophy in general
and social theory in particular. Consequently, the essays appear to be
aimed at a small circle of academics whose main business is to be subtle
about matters concerning Weberian scholarship.
And yet Hennis argues that there are fundamental reasons why the
proper understanding of Max Weber's life and work should be important
to all those concerned with modern social theory and research. The
proper understanding of Weber's lifetime work, he argues, would have
the effect of making us "aware of the questions that we no longer pose,
and thereby provide an impulse for the posing of new questions" (p. 104).
To appreciate Hennis's effort, it is necessary to follow the thrust of some
of his specific claims. Because of space constraints, I shall note only three
such claims.
One of the most controversial claims Hennis wishes to make is that
sociologists have smothered Weber's vision by appropriating him as the
founder of sociology. From Reinhard Bendix to Talcott Parsons, sociologists have presented Weber as the founder of a science that tries to shake
free from grounding values and from the great Western conversation
concerning the "good life" and the "good society." Rather than being a
man preoccupied with founding sociology, Hennis argues, Max Weber
was at home with the moral science of Karl Knies (economics) or with the
moral teachings of Nietzsche. Insofar as Weber approached the study of
society scientifically, he should be seen as a political theorist in the tradition of Machiavelli, Rousseau, and Tocqueville.
In his rush to rescue Weber from the clutches of sociologists, Hennis
does not ask himself why Weber would be seen as the founder of sociology. Surely, sociologists have claimed other founding fathers. Nonetheless, Hennis has made an important point. Many sociologists today do
pretend to see their work as taking place within the "objective" parameters of science. It is a sad commentary on the state of sociology that its
initial grounding values-given in the work of Weber to be sure, but also
in those of Marx, Durkheim, and Freud-are no longer seen as constitutive of its practice.
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A second point Hennis is intent on making is that, contrary to the
claims of such scholars as Friedrich Tembruck and Reinhard Bendix,
Weber's central question was never "What is the meaning of rationality?"
Rather, Weber's guiding question was connected with the development of
humanity (M enschentum), with "the fate of man as man" (p. 46). To
appreciate properly the "inner sense" of Weber's work, argues Hennis,
one has to be prepared to reconstruct Weber's vision from the scattered
available pieces; one has to be prepared to grasp Weber's unconscious
motivations (p. 65). Above all, one must avoid the artificial division, so
current today, between the young and the old Weber. Weber's youthful
report on the Polish peasants, for example, must be seen as deeply connected with his late work on the "life spheres," where the disenchantment
of the Western world is displayed with courage and daring.
Hennis shows a disciplined command of the materials at hand to make
his case. His training as a lawyer (he betrays a sense of pride in noting
that Weber, too, was trained in the law) serves him well. But there is an
important and unexplored contradiction in this reading of Weber's work.
How could Weber be fundamentally concerned with the fate of humankind while holding on to the nation as the only pole on which modern man
could center his nihilistic existence?
Finally, Hennis claims that contrary to much recent talk, even by such
subtle critics as Leo Strauss and Robert Eden, Weber cannot be considered either an old or a modern liberal. Weber never believed in the liberal
theory of progress; he never held on to the liberal idea that an increasing
harmony of individual interests will eventually produce happiness; he
never believed that mechanisms of checks and balances will preserve,
much less produce, freedom. At most, argues Hennis, Weber might be
seen as holding forth a "liberal voluntarism" (p. 186), where the Nietzschean contempt for those last men who invented happiness would be
kept at the level of consciousness. More than anything else, he argues,
Weber's work must be seen as exemplifying the "logic of judgement," that
knack for gathering disparate facts into a vision even, or precisely, when
the facts point to a reality that is falling apart.
The Causes of Progress: Culture, Authority and Change. By Emmanuel
Todd. Translated by Richard Boulind. New York: Basil Blackwell,
1987. Pp. xv+217. $34.95.
Harvey J. Graff
University of Texas at Dallas
The Causes of Progress is a bold little book. Its author, Emmanuel Todd,
declares that it is "one step on the way towards a new interpretation of
historical change," in its emphasis on the role of "stable anthropological
factors" in the "modernization process" (p. xiii). For Todd, it is family
structures that, in their influence on ideology and now on cultural devel263
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